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Abstract
The U.S. recession, which began in the fall of 2007, continues to
severely affect many organizations in the private and public sectors. Many
governmental entities and unions have been forced to negotiate during a
period of stagnant or declining tax revenues, combined with continuously
rising health insurance and pension costs. These economic realities have
resulted in a substantial number of contract talks leading to impasse. In the
public sector, the laws providing for collective bargaining also often require
certain forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve impasse,
primarily mediation and fact finding or advisory arbitration. Both of these
methods however, contain major limitations-primarily no guaranteed
settlement. "Final-offer arbitration," also called "last, best offer" or "baseball
arbitration," has been used by some governments as an ADR method that
guarantees a settlement. A new Indiana law covering public sector teachers
and school employers contains some unique features that should be
considered by public sector organizations seeking changes in their current
impasse resolution method. This paper reviews the topic of public sector
collective bargaining during the current recession, the new Indiana law, final-
offer arbitration as a means of resolving impasse, and final-offer issues for
consideration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
State and local governments are feeling a world of economic pain.
Revenues have dropped considerably since the current recession began in
2008, yet health care and pension costs have continued to rise.' Because
personnel costs comprise up to 85% of the total operating cost of some state
and local governments, 2 these governments have looked to their employees
as a source of budget cuts. Public-sector employees, many of whom are
unionized and covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), however,
understandably are not keen on layoffs or cuts in wages and benefits, but in
many cases accepted furloughs or wage cuts to avoid layoffs. 3
Ideally, public-sector employers and employees would collectively
bargain to resolve their differences. That process largely worked in times of
economic prosperity, but it has not worked as well during the Great
Recession as governments faced with reductions in revenues, but expected to
continue the same levels of service, have sought to negotiate reductions in
worker wages and benefits. 4 "Evergreen" clauses-providing that when a
CBA expires, its terms remain in effect until a new CBA is negotiated 5-in
1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES: SUMMARY 2010 (Dec.
2011), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/state/ 1 Ostatesummaryreport.pdf.
2 Clyde W. Summers, Bargaining in the Government's Business: Principles and
Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 268 (1987) (stating that "labor costs may be 70% of a
city's budget."). That percentage has certainly risen since 1987 thanks to significant
increases in health care benefit costs.
3 Leslie Eaton, Ryan Knutson, & Philip Shishkin, States Shut Down to Save Cash,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2009, at Al, 6.
4 See Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of Employee
Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 110 (2010).
5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 369 (9th ed. 2009).
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many CBAs give unions a disincentive to negotiate.6 Both parties may agree
to mediation, fact-finding or non-binding arbitration when the parties'
positions are at impasse, and neither party fears the other's use of the types of
economic weapons (e.g., strike, lockout) with the knowledge that at the end
of the ADR process, they may very well still be at impasse. 7 Binding
"interest" arbitration encourages the parties to stake out extreme positions
rather than encouraging them toward middle ground.8 For these reasons,
public-sector labor negotiations have become more acrimonious and less
likely to lead to a successful resolution.
For public-sector parties seeking a means of avoiding impasse, final-
offer arbitration may offer a solution. Known also as baseball arbitration for
its use in resolving salary disputes between Major League Baseball (MLB)
owners and players, in final-offer arbitration, both parties submit a proposal
to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator must select one or the other proposal in
toto.9 It offers at least four benefits to public-sector bargaining. First, it
encourages the parties toward middle ground because the arbitrator will pick
the more reasonable of the two offers.10 Second, it encourages pre-hearing
settlement by the parties before the case is sent to arbitration." Third, it
provides finality, unlike mediation or non-binding arbitration.12 Fourth, it
avoids the politically unpalatable prospect offered by interest arbitration of
an unelected arbitrator drafting a public-sector contract from whole cloth.13
This article argues that public sector employers and unions should
consider adding final-offer arbitration as a tool in their negotiation toolbox.
Part II of this article discusses the current status of collective bargaining in
the public sector. Part III describes final-offer arbitration as it currently is
used by the MLB. Part IV reviews the limited circumstances in which final-
6 See, e.g., Alex Bloom, Court Decision Re-Shapes Union Negotiations, EAGLE TR.
(Nov. 14, 2010) http://www.eagletribune.com/local/xl930917848/Court-decision-re-
shapes-union-negotiations.
7 Michael R. Carrell & Christina Heavrin, Negotiating Public Sector Labor
Agreements in Times ofDeficit Budgets: Alternative Methods, 1-17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, 7 4th Annual Conference, Miami, FL
(Oct. 20, 2009), 14.
8 PETER FEUILLE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION: CONCEPTS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND
TECHNIQUES 6 (Steven B. Rynecki ed., 1975).
9 Id.
101d.
11 Robert G. Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
815, 828 (1984).
12 FEUILLE, supra note 8.
13 Id.
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offer arbitration has been used in public sector bargaining, evaluates the
advantages and disadvantages of its use in this context, and makes
recommendations on when and how it can be used most effectively. Part V
concludes
II. BACKGROUND: BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A. Fiscal Pain
The current economic recession which began in 2008 has been cited as
the worst in the U.S. since the Great Depression of the 1930s.14 The impact
on the budgets of public-sector entities, such as state and local governments
and school boards, has been devastating. 15 Tax revenues have remained
stagnant or fallen' 6 even as the costs of providing health care and pensions to
employees have continued to rise.17 Because personnel costs can comprise up
to 70-85% of total operating costs for many governments,' 8 the double
impact of declining or stagnant revenues with continually rising personnel
costs has caused significant budgetary pain.19 Cuts in non-personnel areas
have not been sufficient to balance the annual budgets for many
governments. 20 Governments with non-organized workforces typically have
responded with layoffs, wage or hiring freezes, or furloughs. 21 Governments
14 Chris Isidore, Its Official: Recession Since Dec. '07, CNN MONEY (Dec. 1, 2008,
12:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news/economy/recession/index.htm; see
also, US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (calculating that the recession
that began in December 2007 lasted 18 months and ended in June of 2009, making it the
longest recession since the 1930s).
15 Elizabeth McNichol et al., States Continue to Feel Recession's Impact, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08.sfp.pdf;
see also, Stephen F. Befort, The Constitutional Dimension of Unilateral Change in
Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 27 ABA J. LABOR & EMPLOY. L. 165, 165-66
(2012) [hereinafter Constitutional Dimension]; Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector
Employment Under Siege, 87 IND. L.J. 231, 231-34 (2011).
16 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.
'7 Id.
18 See Summers, supra note 2.
19 McNichol, supra note 15.
20 Id.
21 Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four-Day Work Weeks: Employer
Sympathy or a Call for Collective Action?, 42 U. CONN. L. REv. 1139 (2010); Nicholas
Johnson et al., State Budget Cuts in the New Fiscal Year are Unnecessarily Harmful, CTR.
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with organized workforces are constrained in how they can cut personnel
costs by the terms of existing CBAs. 22 As those CBAs have expired,
however, governments have come under intense economic pressure to
engage in concessionary bargaining-or even to unilaterally change the terms
of existing CBAs23-to cut personnel costs and balance budgets.
This is the first time that many governments and their labor organizations
have experienced severe concessionary bargaining for two reasons. First, the
current recession has affected the public sector more than any recession since
the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935.24 Prior recessions have
tended to impact the private sector much more than the public sector. 25
Second, the public sector is much more heavily organized today than it was
several decades ago, and this is the first major recession that many newly
organized public sector workforces have experienced. 26 Although in 2011
private-sector union density is at a post-World War II low of 6.9%, the
overall (federal, state, local) public-sector union density is over five times
that of the private sector at 37%, and the density of state employees has risen
to 31.5% and local governments have the largest percentage of employees
represented by a union, 43.2%, of any occupational category. 27
Concession bargaining, sometimes called "givebacks," is defined as
collectively-bargained reductions in previously negotiated wages and
benefits usually in exchange for some form of job security. 28 Concession
bargaining in the private sector first gained national attention in 1979 when
Chrysler Corporation, facing bankruptcy, negotiated over $200 million in
givebacks. 29 The recession of the early 1980s then caused the airline industry
and other hard-hit industries to experience severe economic pain.30 Private-
sector concession bargaining spread to most industrial sectors, eventually
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-22-
12.sfp.pdf (calculating that since December of 2007, 44 states have reduced their
personnel costs through layoffs, unpaid leaves, hiring freezes, or similar actions).
22 Befort, Constitutional Dimension, supra note 15.
23 Id.
24 Bob Herbert, Invitation to Disaster, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at A19.
25 Carrell & Heavrin, supra note 7, at 1-3.
26 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Bureau of Labor Statistics, ECONoMIC NEWS RELEASE
(January 27, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
27 Id.
28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 328 (9t ed. 2009).
29 Thomas Miner, The Kenneth M Piper Lectures: Concession Bargaining, 59 CHi.-
KENT L. REv. 981, 986 (1983).
30 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON LABOR RELATIONS IN AN ECONOMIC
RECESSION: JOB LOSSES AND CONCESSION BARGAINING 56-59 (1982).
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reaching more than two-thirds of all private-sector CBAs.31 The public sector,
however, generally avoided such concessions, except for occasional wage
freezes or modest health-insurance-premium or co-pay increases. 32
Today, things are different. The current economic recession has caused
public-sector management negotiators to seek significant concessions in
wages, hours, health care, and pensions, often leading to prolonged
negotiations and impasse. 33 In past difficult economic times, many
governments and their labor organizations negotiated wage freezes and
modest increases in health care premiums and co-payments, but very few
were forced to negotiate significant concessions beyond those givebacks.34
The current recession, however, has precipitated a "new era" of wage and
benefit concessions -new both in scope and magnitude.35
B. Differences with the Private Sector
Federal and state statutes covering public-sector collective bargaining are
largely modeled after the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 36
Nonetheless, many laws, practices, and economic forces in the public sector
are very different from those in the private sector, and often vary widely
among each other as well. 37 Though these differences may include the
mechanics of organizing employees and negotiating agreements, of
determining bargaining issues and positions, of costing wage and benefit
proposals, and of processing of grievances and arbitrations 38 three
differences are particularly relevant for the purpose of this article. First,
public-sector labor negotiators are less affected by external economic
constraints than their private-sector counterparts. 39 Second, public-sector
31 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Employers Will Seek Concessions in Benefits,
May Make Them on Wages, BNA Report Finds, in 2005 SOURCE BOOK ON COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 37-38 (2005).
32 Id.
33 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Communication Called Essential for Bargaining
in Tough Times, BNA Reports, in 2010 SOURCE BOOK ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 91
(2010).
34 Id.
35 Carrell & Heavrin, supra note 7, at 1-17.
36 VICTORIA E. ULLMANN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 331 (Pamela Fuller et al.
eds., 2004).
37 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 189-95 (4th ed.
2004).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 189.
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labor negotiators have fewer and less potent economic weapons at their
disposal. 40 Third, public-sector labor negotiations are affected by electoral
politics in a way that private-sector labor negotiations are not.41
The first salient difference is the extent to which bargaining is affected
by external economic forces. In the private sector, collective bargaining is
significantly shaped by external economic forces, especially domestic and
foreign competition. 42 Companies are driven by profits; their assets and
income must exceed liabilities and expenses or they will not be in business
for long.43 The private sector must be responsive to its customers because it
operates in a competitive arena, and unless it provides its customers with the
best value for the price, the customers will go elsewhere. 44 Management thus
has a built-in incentive to keep labor costs low.45 Unions, though they have a
strong incentive to bargain for high labor cost, recognize that labor costs
cannot be so high as to make the bompany's products or services
uncompetitive in the marketplace.46
In the public sector, however, collective bargaining ultimately is shaped
by internal and political forces, and less the external forces present in the
private sector.47 The services that are provided by governments generally are
not available elsewhere and are critical to health, safety, and welfare of a
community or state, including education, public safety, public health and
social services, and public utilities.48 The public sector is largely financed by
taxes and fees, and thus is not subjected to a competitive marketplace.49
Governments are not businesses; they often operate as a monopoly without
the pressures of external competition, especially in areas such as fire
40 1d. at 192.
41 Id. at 191.
42 Donald A. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 603 (1985).
43 Id. at 605.
44 Id. at 604.
45 Id. at 605.
46 Id.
47 Janet C. Fisher, Reinventing a Livelihood: How United States Labor Laws, Labor-
Management Cooperation Initiatives, and Privatization Influence Public Sector Labor
Markets, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 563-84 (1997). However, as Joseph Slater pointed
out in a comment to this draft, there often are significant areas in which there is private
competition for public services, either through similar private institutions, such as schools,
or through privatization plans or threats. Such external market forces subject some of the
public sector to some degree of wage competition.
4 8 Id. at 569.
49 Id.
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protection and police forces. 50 Public-sector management and unions thus do
not feel the pressure of external competitive forces; public-sector unions can
pressure elected officials to raise taxes or make budget reductions in other
government services, and public-sector management may be less inclined to
resist those pressures than private-sector management.5 '
The second salient difference between public-and private-sector
bargaining is the availability of economic weapons. In the private sector, a
union's chief economic weapon is the right to strike. 52 This weapon is
balanced-some would argue unevenly-by the employer's right to lock-out 53
workers during a labor dispute and to "permanently replace" 54 workers who
strike. These economic weapons at least in theory encourage management
and unions to bargain for terms and conditions of employment that are
reasonable given the prevailing economic circumstances. 55 For example, if
management offers too little at the bargaining table (too small of
wage/benefit increases during economic prosperity or too many concessions
during recession), the union will be able to call a strike and management will
have a difficult time finding replacement workers on the terms being offered.
On the other hand, if the union demands are out of line with economic reality
(too large of wage/benefit increases during economic prosperity or too few
concessions during recession), the employer will easily be able to hire
replacement workers on the terms being offered and will break the strike.
These reciprocal economic weapons thus encourage both management and
unions to adjust their bargaining demands to prevailing economic
conditions-in a recession like the current one, unions tend to accede to
concession bargaining because economic conditions diminish the bargaining
efficacy of their chief economic weapon. 56
Not so in the public sector, on both sides of the bargaining table. Public-
sector management negotiators are loath to lockout garbage collectors and
50 Id. at 564.
5 1 Id. at 566.
52 See NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 477 (1960).
53 Am. Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
54 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 343 (1938).
55 The effects that unions have on labor and strike economics was first significantly
theorized by J.R. Hicks in his 1932 book THE THEORY OF WAGES; his theories have been
expanded on since then but still remain influential. See PAUL FLATAU, HICKS'S THE
THEORY OF WAGES: IT'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF NEO-CLASSICAL DISTRIBUTION
THEORY 1, 7 (2002), http://www.mbs.murdoch.edu.au/workingpapers/187.pdf.
56 Stephanie Fitch & Christopher Steiner, Critical Mess, 185 FORBES 24-26 (June 7,
2010).
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teachers, and police officers and firefighters are not easily replaceable.57 On
the union side, most public-sector employees and their labor organizations do
not have the legal right to strike. 58 Consequently, whereas reciprocal
economic weapons drive private-sector labor negotiators toward a settlement
reflecting current economic conditions, public-sector labor negotiators
operate under no such constraints. 59 Most state and local collective-
bargaining legislation attempts to compensate by adding to the general duty
of good-faith bargaining the additional burden of completing an ADR
regimen. 60 This addition offsets the union's right to strike with an increased
burden to use some form of ADR. 61
The third salient difference between public- and private-sector
bargaining is the existence of electoral politics. Unions in both the public and
private sectors often lobby on behalf of their members. 62 In the public sector,
however, the lobbying goes beyond just seeking favorable labor legislation
and often includes direct lobbying for increased pay and benefits, either to
approve a tentative agreement reached with management negotiators, or to
bypass management and appeal directly to the legislative body.63 Employee
organizations also affect the budgeting process through the election
process. 64 Public employees are highly motivated to vote, 65 to support certain
57 GOULD, supra note 37, at 192-93.
58 ULLMANN, supra note 36 (noting that the fear of being unable to provide essential
services to citizens may provide a rationale for denying public workers the legal right to
strike). But cf Martin H. Malin, Public Employee's Rights to Strike: Law and Experience,
26 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM, 313, 313 (1992) (showing that studies of public workers in
Illinois and Ohio have demonstrated that strike legalization did not increase strike
incidence and may very well have decreased it).
59 See Malin, supra note 58, at 317.
60 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.07 (West 2006); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77
(West 2006).
61 See Mountain Valley Educ. Ass'n. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 655 A.2d 348
(1995).
62 See Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT'L AFFAIRS, Fall
2010, at 3.
63 Id. There is, however, a debate on the efficacy of these tactics. See, e.g., Ronald N.
Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Public Sector Employee Voter Participation & Salaries, 68
PUB. CHOICE 137, 146-49 (1991) (analyzing voter turnout, union lobbying, and salaries
between federal and local government employees revealed that even though local
workers had a higher voter turnout and more organized local lobbying, they still received
lower salaries than federal government workers).
64 DiSalvo, supra note 62, at 10.
65 For example in the November 2010 election 60.3% of government workers voted
as opposed to only 43% of private industry workers. Voting and Registration in the
9
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candidates, and to have a seat at the table when government resources are
allocated. 66 However, because governmental resources are not elastic,
substantial increases in one area mean decreases in others. 67 So public
employees, when engaged in the collective bargaining process, are
influencing the budget-making process as well. 68
C. Public Sector Impasse Resolution Options
The general philosophy of both management and labor negotiators
during the economic recession has been to "share the pain."69 Rather than
trying to achieve significant budget cuts solely by layoffs, which often was
the only solution in the past, the goal has been to reduce the wages and/or
hours and benefits of both union and non-union workers. 70 These efforts
have in some cases been combined with limited layoffs, particularly of
nonunion employees. 71 A 2009 survey by the Society for Human Resource
Management found that 37% of both private and public sector human
resource managers reported that they had developed alternatives in addition
to layoffs.72 While layoffs may be easier, human resource managers noted it
may be cheaper and more humane to cut hours or wage rates than lay off
workers. 73
Nonetheless, many public-sector concessionary bargaining efforts have
resulted in impasse.74 One reason for this is that many public-sector CBAs
Election of November 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/201 0/tables.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
66 DiSalvo, supra note 62, at 11-12; see also Don Bellante et al., Vallejo Con Dios:
Why Public Sector Unionism is a Bad Deal for Taxpayers and Representative
Government, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 645 (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa645.pdf.
67 Bellante, supra note 66.
6 8 Id.
6 9 Beth Mirza, Look at Alternatives to Layoffs, SOC'Y. FOR HUM. RESOURCES MGMT.
(Dec. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/businessleadership/articles/Pages/AltemativestoLayoffs.a
spx; Matthew Boyle, Cutting Costs Without Cutting Jobs, BUSINESSWEEK 5 (March 9, 2009).
70 Mizra, supra note 69.
71 Id.
72 Mizra, supra note 69.
73 Boyle, supra note 69.
74 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 6 (discussing court abrogation of evergreen clauses
in Massachusetts' CBAs).
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contain "evergreen clauses" providing that when the agreement expires, the
terms remain in effect until a new CBA is negotiated. 75 Evergreen clauses
vary, and some require the continuation only of employee benefits so
affected employees do not suffer a break in health insurance coverage,
pension contributions, and other benefits until a new agreement is reached.76
Other clauses, however, provide continuation of the entire CBA in perpetuity
until a new agreement is reached.77 Thus, union negotiators with evergreen
clauses in their CBAs have little reason to agree to concessions-except
possibly goodwill, public pressure, or to guarantee job security for members
by minimizing layoffs in the bargaining unit.78
Public-sector labor negotiators that have managed to resolve negotiation
impasses generally have done so in one of two ways. The first is by finding
creative ways to share the pain, such as unpaid furloughs, reduced hours,
reducing costs, or using indexed changes in future economic conditions (akin
to private-sector profit-sharing plans-see Table 1).79 The second is by using
ADR, especially mediation and arbitration.80
Because most public employees do not have the legal right to strike,
reaching an impasse in the public sector is often different than in the private
sector. 81 In the private sector, impasse is reached when the parties have
exhausted bargaining efforts without reaching agreement. 82 However, most
public-sector legislation giving public employees the right to collectively
bargain specifies that impasse cannot occur as a matter of law until the
parties have exhausted bargaining efforts and then completed some form of
ADR protocol, such as mediation, fact-finding, and/or arbitration. 83 The
rationale for this additional element of impasse lies in the restrictions placed
75 Id.
76 Bloom, supra note 6; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-278(a) (West 2006).
77 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A. 102(3) (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 41.56.123 (West 2006).
78 Bloom, supra note 6.
79 See Mizra, supra note 69; see also Boyle, supra note 69.
80 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER RESOURCES 112, 209 (2003).
81 Gary Long & Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: Sudden Death in Eugene, 27
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 186, 186 (1974).
82 Id.
83 Id. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 2006); HAWAII REV. STAT. ANN. §
89-11 (West 2006). But see, Martin H. Malin, Two Models of Interest Arbitration, -
___OHIo ST. J. DiSP RESOL. __(arguing that the right to strike is particularly preferable
to interest arbitration in times of recession, and citing illustrative data from Illinois).
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on public employees. 84 Because the law withholds from public-sector unions
the economic weapon most potent in the private-sector union arsenal-the
strike-lawmakers often add to the duty of good-faith bargaining the burden
of completing an ADR regimen.85 This addition is intended to offset the
union's restricted rights with a burden most often borne by management.
For example, in a case involving the Maine School District, the Supreme
Court of Maine held that a school district's unilateral implementation of
changed contract terms prior to completion of the statutory ADR regimen
would be a per se violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.86 The court
explained that the 'peaceful' third-party intervention procedures are
intended as substitutes for strikes and work stoppages, "and are designed to
provide escalating pressure on both parties to produce a voluntary
settlement." 87
Impasse resolution options in the public sector often are more limited
than in the private sector. For example, the private sector has increasingly
used profit-sharing plans to negotiate future economic wage enhancements or
one-time bonuses.88 These plans are popular because they tie employee gains
to the employer's profitability and thus ability to pay.89 In the public sector,
of course, no profit-sharing plans exist. 90 However, a few public-sector
entities have negotiated clauses that index future wage or benefit increases to
future revenue increases. In Louisville, Kentucky, for example, negotiators
agreed on a variable wage formula which directly links future pay rates with
future increases in tax revenues (see Table 1). Such an approach offers
benefits to both parties. Local governments prefer an indexed formula
because it does not lock them into fixed-rate pay increases they may not be
able to afford in the future. Employees avoid the downside risk of a wage cut
and, if tax revenues increase, obtain the benefit of wage increases without
having to resort to a risky wage re-opener process. Both sides benefit from
the ability to negotiate longer term contracts. 91 Both sides also benefit
because wage rates become tied to current economic conditions-wages will
84 Long & Feuille, supra note 81, at 186.
85 Id. See also, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.07 (West 2006); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.77 (West 2006).
86 Mountain Valley Educ. Ass'n.,655 A.2d at 354. See also Wasco Cnty. v.
AFSCME, 613 P.2d 1067, 1069-71 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
87 Id
88 Carrell & Heavrin, supra note 7, at 1-17.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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rise when a strong economy causes tax revenues to rise, but will remain
constant in times of recession. 92
TABLE 1 VARIABLE WAGE FORMULA
Article 20 - Schedule of Pay and Longevity
Section 1.c. On July 1, 2008, the hourly base pay rates shall be increased by a
percentage equal to one-half of the percentage increase in the occupational license
fee revenue received by Metro Government from the Revenue Commission for the
then most recently concluding fiscal year as estimated in Metro Government's
Annual budget Document and confirmed within 90 days of the close of the fiscal
year and retroactively added to the hourly rate so to be effective on July I of the
respective fiscal year or 2% whichever is more.
Source: Collective Bargaining Agreement By and Between
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government and Louisville Professional
Firefighters Association Local Union 345, IAFF AFL-CIO-CLC (October 10,
2007-June 30, 2009)
D. Public Sector ADR Methods
Traditional forms of ADR include mediation, arbitration, and fact-
finding. 93 In any public-sector negotiation impasse, one or more of these
techniques, each of which has unique advantages and disadvantages, may be
successful.
Mediation is required in most states with public-sector collective
bargaining. 94 As in the private sector, the mediator has no independent
authority to render a decision, but uses acquired skills to bring the parties
back together and reach an agreement. 95 Mediation may be provided by the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS),96 American Arbitration
Association (AAA), 97 state labor departments, or local mediation boards.98
92 Carrell & Heavrin, supra note 7, at 6-8.
93 W.D. HEISIL & J.D. HALLIHAN, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
NEGOTIATION 103-12 (1967).
94 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 1366 (Alan M. Ruben ed., 6th
ed. 2003) [hereinafter ELKOURI & ELKOURI].
95 HEISIL & HALLIHAN, supra note 93, at 103.
96 FED. MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERV., available at
http://www.fmcs.gov/intemet/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
97 AM. ARB. Ass'N, available at http://www.adr.org/about (last visited Jan 25, 2012).
98 HEISIL & HALLIHAN, supra note 93, at 103.
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The primary advantage of mediation is the parties themselves develop an
agreement they believe they can live with and do not have a decision
imposed on them.99 The primary disadvantage is that, because the mediator
lacks the power to compel a resolution, mediation often results in simply
prolonging the impasse. 00
Fact-finding and advisory arbitration is more common in the public
sector than in the private sector. 01 Under these processes, an unbiased third
party examines the collective bargaining impasse and provides factual
findings and recommendations on how the parties might resolve the
impasse.102 The factual findings may help resolve the impasse by eliminating
the distrust one party feels for the other party's facts or figures. 103
Reasonable recommendations may pressure a party to accept an offer that
otherwise would not have been considered. 104 Fact-finding and advisory
arbitration are particularly effective when the findings and recommendations
are announced publicly because of the political pressure likely to be brought
by elected officials and the public on a party with an unreasonable bargaining
position.105 However, like mediation, fact-finding and advisory arbitration do
not permit the neutral to compel a resolution and therefore may simply
prolong impasse.106
Interest arbitration differs from mediation, fact-finding, and advisory
arbitration in that the neutral makes a final and binding decision on a
negotiation dispute.10 7 It often is used in the public sector to resolve impasses
as an alternative to the economic pressure of a strike used in the private
sector. 08 It has two primary advantages. First, it resolves the impasse and
ends the need for further bargaining.109 Second, the threat of looming interest
arbitration often motivates the parties to settle without interest arbitration
99 FED. MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERV., Using a Third-Party Neutral,
http://www.fmcs.gov/intemet/itemDetail.asp?categorylD=141&itemlD=15911 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2012).
100 DANIEL P. O'MEARA, ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTEs 64-65 (2002).
101 HEISIL & HALLIHAN, supra note 93, at 108.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 109.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 108-09.
106 O'MEARA, supra note 100, at 65.
107 HEISIL & HALLIHAN, supra note 93, at 107.
10 8 Id. at 108.
109 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 1367.
14
[Vol. 28:1 2013]
CONSIDERING FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION
having to be used. 110 In jurisdictions with interest arbitration, the majority of
collective bargaining contracts are settled voluntarily by the parties without
resorting to arbitration, which according to one study was only used to
resolve between 6-29% of negotiations."1 In jurisdictions permitting strikes,
or where strikes occur even if they are forbidden, interest arbitration may
reduce conflict and build consensus between the two parties as an alternative
to a strike. 12
There are also, however, several disadvantages to interest arbitration.
First, if the parties view negotiations as a prelude to a mini-trial in front of an
interest arbitrator, the parties may be less willing to make their strongest
arguments at the bargaining table, and instead may sandbag until the
arbitration; 113 this may have a "chilling effect" on negotiations and
discourage the "give and take" necessary for good-faith collective
bargaining. 114 Second, knowing that the arbitrators will "begin" the
deliberations with where the parties "ended" their negotiations, the parties
may be more likely to stake out polar positions and less likely to compromise
at the bargaining table.115 Third, interest arbitrators may be tempted to "split
the difference" between the parties' positions, which will further tend to
encourage the parties to stake out polar positions at the bargaining table.' 16
Fourth, it is quite possible that the arbitrator will impose a resolution that
neither party is happy with. Fifth, interest arbitration places decisions that
affect citizens and taxpayers in the hands of non-elected officials who are
politically accountable to no one.11 7 This accountability problem may be
magnified because an interest arbitration decision setting
wages/benefits/working conditions for one bargaining unit could have a
ripple effect on collective bargaining negotiations with other bargaining units
110 MICHAEL R. CARRELL & CHRISTINA HEAVRIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 107 (10th ed. 2012).
111 David B. Lipsky & Harry C. Katz, Alternative Approaches to Interest
Arbitration: Lessons from New York City, 35 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 265, 267 (2006).
112 RICHARD C. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 287 (Evan M.
Berman ed., 4th ed. 2008).
113 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 1366.
114 Peter Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect, 14 INDUS. REL. 302,
304 (1975); see also Raymond L. Hogler & Kurt Kriksciun, Impasse Resolutions in
Public Sector Collective Negotiations: A Proposed Procedure, 6 INDUS. REL. L. J. 481,
487 (1984).
I15 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 21.
116 Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer "Baseball" Arbitrations: Contexts, Mechanics &
Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 88 (2010).
117 DiSalvo, supra note 62, at 17.
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that are not in front of the arbitration panel.118 Sixth, there are serious
questions about whether public-sector interest arbitration is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority."19
Final-offer arbitration, also known as "last best offer" (LBO) or
baseball arbitration, is a less-common method of public-sector ADR. As in
interest arbitration, the arbitrator in final-offer arbitration generally makes a
final and binding decision on a negotiation dispute.1 20 However, unlike
interest arbitration, where the arbitrator has the authority to fashion whatever
resolution s/he sees fit, in final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator is limited to
choosing between the parties' last best offers either on a "total package"
basis or on an issue-by-issue basis.1 21 In other words, the arbitrator must
choose whichever party's last offer is the most reasonable.
Final-offer arbitration offers all the advantages of interest arbitration: it
resolves the impasse with finality and encourages the parties to settle before
arbitration 122 It simultaneously avoids the disadvantages of interest
arbitration. First, because the arbitrator must choose the more reasonable of
the parties' final proposals, the process encourages the parties to negotiate
toward middle ground rather than staking out polar positions.123 Second, the
existence of a clear winner and loser in final-offer arbitration encourages the
parties settle before arbitration. 124 Third, because the arbitrator must choose
one of the parties' proposals, final-offer arbitration avoids the politically
unpalatable prospect offered by interest arbitration of an unelected arbitrator
drafting a public-sector contract.125 In essence, when the parties are worried
that the arbitrator will accept the offer of the other party, they are pressured
to make more reasonable offers in negotiations, which may promote a
settlement prior to the hearing.126 Although only a few state public sector
dispute resolution techniques explicitly permit or require final offer
118 For example, if an interest arbitrator awards a certain pay increase to firefighters,
police officers are likely to expect an equal amount.
119 Kenneth P. Swan, Public Bargaining in Canada and the U.S.: A Legal View, 19
INDUS. REL. 272, 278 (1980).
120 FEUILLE, supra note 8, at 12.
121 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 1367-69.
122 FEUILLE, supra note 8, at 12-13.
123 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 1367.
124 Long & Feuille, supra note 81, at 190.
125 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 1367; see also DiSalvo, supra note 62, at
7.
126 Tulis, supra note 116, at 89.
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arbitration, this article argues that final offer arbitration should be considered
by future public sector policy-makers and negotiators.
III. FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Public-sector employees and Major League Baseball players in many
ways are similarly situated.127 Both, for example, must bargain exclusively
with employers that maintain a semi-monopoly, and thus the employees are
"locked-in" to a relationship with a single employer making it impossible to
establish a true market value for their services. 128 Additionally, often the
disputed issues are few and center on salaries and wages. 129 Final-offer
arbitration often is referred to as "baseball" arbitration because of its high-
profile use in deciding salary disputes between players and clubs. Final-offer
arbitration serves both baseball and public-sector entities well because it
provides incentive for a pre-hearing settlement to avoid loss, and it
guarantees a final decision and an end to the dispute.130
The Major League Baseball Player's Association (MLBPA) was formed
in 1953.131 In 1966, the MLBPA hired Marvin Miller, from the United
Steelworkers of America, to negotiate for higher player salaries and pensions,
and to fight the reserve clause which bound players to the team with which
they originally signed for one year beyond the end of an existing contract. 132
In 1968, Miller negotiated the players' first CBA, raising the annual
minimum salary from $6,000 to $10,000.133 In 1970, Miller negotiated for an
arbitration clause in the CBA to resolve all disputes arising under the CBA;
previously, disputes were resolved by the MLB Commissioner who served at
the whim of MLB owners. 134
In 1969, when Curt Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies from
the St. Louis Cardinals, he refused the trade and in 1970 sued Major League
127 Id. at 101.
128 Id. at 102.
129 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 92, at 1328 (the scope of arbitration varies from
state to state and is almost always limited by statute).
130 Tulis, supra note 116, at 101-02.
131 GLENN M. WONG, THE ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 462 (4th ed. 2010).
132 ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION 29-30 (2000).
133 Id. at 30 (indicating a change from $5,000 to $10,000 per year); but see, Marvin
Miller, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE BASEBALL
REVOLUTION 163 (2004) (recognizing the $6,000 to $10,000 per year increase).
134 See Miller, supra note 134, at 173.
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Baseball for violation of the federal antitrust laws. 135 In 1972, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Flood v. Kuhn, a five to three decision, sided with the
owners and cited the longstanding exemption of major league baseball from
antitrust laws. 136
Nonetheless, over the next several years the MLBPA achieved at the
bargaining table and through arbitration what it could not in the courts. In
1974, Miller used arbitration to resolve a dispute when Oakland A's owner
Charlie Finley failed to make an annuity payment as required by Catfish
Hunter's contract. 137 The arbitrator ruled that Finley had breached the
contract, rendering Hunter free to negotiate a new contract with any team.138
When Hunter signed a five-year, $3.5 million contract with the Yankees, the
players saw the value of free agency.139
Also in 1974, Miller encouraged two players, Andy Messersmith and
Dave McNally, to play out the succeeding year without signing a contract.140
After the year had elapsed, both players filed a grievance arbitration.141 The
arbitrator ruled that both players had fulfilled their contractual obligations
and had no further legal ties to their teams, thus effectively eradicating the
reserve clause.142
Owners worried that universal free agency would increase team payroll
costs exponentially.143 Miller worried that universal free agency would drive
down the salaries of star players because of unrestricted supply. 144 The
parties therefore agreed to a provision in the CBA that limited free agency to
players with more than six years of service.145
This was terrific for the players who now became free agents and could
sell their talents on the open market, but it would not have been much help to
players within their first six years of service who were restricted to
negotiating with a single team. 146 Miller wanted to find a way for these early-
135 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972).
136 Id. at 285.
137 Susan B. Seabury, The Development and Role of Free Agency in Major League
Baseball, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 335, 351 (1998).
13 8 Id.
139 Id. at 352.
140 See Miller, supra note 134, at 238-53.
'41 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 266-67.
144 Id.
'45 Id.
146 ABRAMS, supra note 132, at 30.
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career players to receive a fair market price for their talents, while still
encouraging owners to bid up the price of a limited pool of free agents. He
also worried that early-career players' bargaining power over salaries would
be diluted because the individualized nature of salary negotiations would
render impotent the threat of a strike (which, as discussed above, is labor's
most potent bargaining weapon) or other form of concerted action to resolve
salary disputes.
Miller's solution was what we now know as baseball arbitration-final-
offer salary arbitration for the early-career players who were restricted to
negotiating with a single team. 147 From Miller's perspective, salary
arbitration would give early-career players the ability to use free agents'
playing statistics and salaries as benchmarks for their own performance and
value-they could say to the arbitrator, in effect, "Free agent X had this
statistical profile as a pitcher and made $Y; my profile is better than his so I
should make $Y+."1 48 From the owners' perspective, salary arbitration was
preferable to the alternative of universal free agency.149 For these reasons,
MLB owners and MLBPA agreed that MLB players would have a
contractual right to free agency after six seasons with their initial team, and
the right to final-offer arbitration to settle salary disputes between the
termination of their first salary contract and the advent of their free
agency.150
It should be noted here that the final-offer arbitration clause in the MLB
CBA pertains only to player salaries, and not to benefits or other terms and
conditions of employment (other disputes arising under the CBA are resolved
through the traditional arbitration clause that Miller negotiated in 1970).151
This is because in MLB, as in the CBAs of the highest level of professional
sports but unlike the CBAs in almost any other setting, the CBA specifies the
benefits and working conditions for all players, but wages are negotiated
individually between player and owner. 152 Note, then, the two critical
147 Id. at 30-31 (under the current CBA, players with at least three but no more than
six years of Major League service are arbitration-eligible and players with at least two but
no more than three years are eligible if they have accumulated at least 86 days of service
in the immediate prior season and are ranked within the top 17% of second year players).
148 Id. at 158 (explaining the core issue of arbitration as deciding how well the
player performed as compared to other players).
14 9 Id. at 29.
150 Michael J. Haupert, The Economic History of Major League Baseball, (Feb. 1,
2010), available at eh.net/encyclopedia/article/haupert.mlb. (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
151 ABRAMS, supra note 133, at 90.
152 Id. (the CBA stipulates a minimum salary, but negotiations for wages above the
minimum are left to the players and owners).
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institutional similarities between early-career MLB players and public-sector
employees: both are tied to a single employer and cannot negotiate in an
open market (though market forces will indirectly constrain bargaining), and
the scope of the dispute centers largely on wages.
The CBA between MLBPA and MLB owners describes player salary
arbitration in Section E.153 This Section provides that the two sides (player's
agent and club's representative) can present their respective cases to a three-
person arbitration panel, and then "the panel is limited to awarding only one
or the other of the two figures submitted" (last offers by the player's agent
and team representative).154 In practice, however, most salary disputes since
1973 have been resolved after both sides have submitted final offers, but
before the arbitrators hear the dispute. 155 Thus, one major advantage of
baseball arbitration has been the pressure it puts on both sides to settle. 156
A second advantage of baseball arbitration is that it encourages the
parties to bargain in good faith, without sandbagging strong arguments until
arbitration.157 If traditional arbitration was used, the parties might fear an
arbitrator would simply split the difference of the last-best final offers; this
would encourage the parties to take polar positions in negotiations to posture
themselves for arbitration.' 5 8 In baseball arbitration, however, the parties
have the opposite incentive-they have every incentive to make a reasonable
proposal to the arbitrator because the arbitrator will choose the more
reasonable offer.159 This undoubtedly explains why the majority of cases
settle before arbitration in the pre-hearing process (for example, in 2009 111
players filed for arbitration, forty-six exchanged final offers with teams, and
153 MLBPA, 2012-2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, 17-22
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited Jan, 28, 2012) [hereinafter
2012-2016 Basic Agreement].
154 Id. at 16.
MLB PLAYERS, MLBPA Info , http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp (last visited
Jan. 25, 2012).
156 Haupert, supra note 150.
157 ABRAMS, supra note 132, at 149.
158 Id.
159 By contrast, the National Hockey League (NHL) also uses arbitration to resolve
player salary disputes. In the NHL, however, unlike in MLB, arbitrators need not choose
either the player's or the owner's offer, but may choose any salary the arbitrators see fit.
This has made NHL salary arbitration particularly contentious and has resulted in the
parties making polarized offers to each other and to arbitrators. See Trevor Levine, Two
Worlds Collide: Salary Arbitration for NHL Players in the Salary Cap Era, 26 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 729, 736-37 (2011).
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only three continued to an arbitration hearing.160 Consistent with this, one
non-MLB empirical study has shown that pre-arbitration settlement is twice
as likely in jurisdictions using final-offer arbitration as it is in jurisdictions
using traditional arbitration. 161
The criteria utilized by panel arbitrators in baseball arbitration are
generally specified by the CBA and include a player's:162
* Contributions during the past season
* Special qualities of leadership and public appeal
* Length and consistency of career contributions
* Compensation of past year
* Compensation of comparative players (at the same position)
* Mental or physical defects (length on disabled list during season)
* Recent performance of Club including league standings and attendance
Not admissible criteria include:
* Financial position of Player or Club
* Press comments except annual awards
* Offers made by either side during negotiations prior to arbitration
* Costs to the parties including fees of attorneys, representatives
* Salaries in other sports
When the owners and players first agreed to the free agency and final-
offer arbitration, Charley Finley, then-owner of the Oakland A's (and the
owner who precipitated free agency by breaching his contract with Catfish
Hunter), noted that "arbitration panels are not baseball people" and predicted
owners would regret agreeing to the new process. 163 By most accounts,
however, the process has been quite successful. It was first used in 1974 to
settle three salary disputes; in the thirty-seven years since (through 2011), it
has been used 501 times. 164
Baseball arbitration has been criticized, albeit relatively mutely, on three
grounds. First, some have argued that the owners have fared better than the
players because through 2011 they won 287 (57%) of the cases submitted to
160 Tulis, supra note 116, at 90.
161 STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 288-89 (4th ed. 2003).
162 2012-2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 153, at 20-21.
163 Maury Brown, Breaking Down How Salary Arbitration Functions in Major
League Baseball, THE Biz OF BASEBALL (Jan. 30, 2009), available at
http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=2916:breakin
g-down-how-salary-arbitration-functions-in-mlb&catid=26:editorials&Itemid=3 9 .
164 MLB PLAYERS, supra note 155.
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final offer arbitration, while the players won 214 (43%) of the cases. 165
However, Maury Brown, founder and president of Business Sports Network
(which among other things tracks baseball arbitration decisions), notes that
most salary disputes are settled in the weeks after the last offers are
submitted and before the arbitrator hears the case, and that the players
usually receive huge increases in salary.166 For example in 2008, the 110
players that settled before arbitration received an average of 120% increase
in salary. 167 Second, and inconsistent with the first criticism, baseball
arbitration has been criticized for inflating player salaries. 168 However,
baseball salary increases are roughly commensurate with salary increases in
the three other major league sports with national television revenues and fan
bases; the average major league baseball player salary in 2010 was $3.3
million, which trailed basketball ($5.8 million ) and hockey ($4.3 million),
and led only football ($1.8 million). 169 Third, some critics of baseball
arbitration have speculated that the panels have a tendency to split their
decisions between clubs and players so as to not favor one side and therefore
be hired again (this is, not coincidently, the same charge frequently levied
against all forms of arbitration). However, Donald Fehr, Executive Director
of the MLBPA cited highly regarded arbitrator Thomas Roberts as saying,
"That's an illusion. A successful arbitrator doesn't pay attention to his box
score, in baseball or anywhere else."' 70
IV. FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION IN PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING
A. Experience in the States
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, twenty-six states
provide public employees collective bargaining rights, twelve states provide
some public-sector employees collective bargaining rights, and twelve states
165 Id.
166 Brown, supra note 163.
167 Id. Maury Brown, Arbitration Scoreboard, THE Biz 0 FBASEBALL(Feb. 10, 2007),
available at
http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=719&Itemid
=116.
168 Brown, supra note 163.
169 MICHAEL R. CARRELL & CHRISTINA HEAVRIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 29 (10th ed. 2012).
170 Stephen Raymond, Perspectives From a Mediator/Arbitrator, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at Cl.
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do not allow collective bargaining by any public sector employees.171 Of the
states permitting public-sector collective bargaining, most do not allow
public-sector employees the right to strike and, therefore, provide some third-
party process such as mediation, advisory arbitration, or fact-finding to
resolve bargaining impasses.172
Currently fourteen states have codified final-offer arbitration as
summarized in Table 2,173 and several of those are limited to certain public
employee groups. In 2011, bills providing for final-offer arbitration for
teachers were introduced in three states. Indiana passed a new law requiring
a unique last-best offer process for teachers and school employers that took
effect July 1, 2011.174 In Pennsylvania a bill to settle teacher-employer
disputes was introduced 75 and in Rhode Island, a new bill including last,
best offer (total package) arbitration for teachers (and a ban on strikes) was
introduced and passed the senate, 176 but the house failed to act on it before
the session ended. 177
Here is some additional information about the final-offer arbitration
statutes described in Table 2. Maine, prior to 1987, provided for non-binding
arbitration of all disputes within its most important industry, agriculture,178
but in 1987 changed to binding final-offer to limit strikes and protect the
general welfare of the state. 179 Michigan, like Wisconsin and New Jersey,
prohibits police and fire employees from striking, and the statute provides a
171 Jeannie Hayes & John Moran, Comparison of Connecticut's State Employees
Collective Bargaining Laws With Those of Bordering States, OLR RESEARCH REPORT
(March 22, 2010), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/rpt/2010-R-0127.htm (last
visited Nov. 29, 2011).
172 Carrell & Heavrin, supra note 7, at 12-15.
173 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 278-79 (4th. ed. 2008) (stating that fifteen states
have final-offer arbitration; note that the number fluctuates as legislation changes).
174 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-15.1 (West 2012).
175 H.B. 1660, 2011 Leg. Sess. (Pa. 2011), available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sess
Yr-2011 &sesslnd=0&billBody-H&billTyp=B&billNbr-1660&pn=2075.
176 Katherine Gregg, Breaking News: Senate Passes Binding Arbitration Bill for
Teacher Contracts, PROVIDENCE J. (June 29, 2011), available at
http://news.providencejoumal.com/breaking-news/2011/06/senate-passes-binding-
arbitrat.html.
177 Jennifer D. Jordan, Breaking News: RI House Kills Binding Arbitration Bill,
PROVIDENCE J. (June 30, 2011), available at
http://news.providencejoumal.com/breaking-news/2011/06/ri-house-kills-binding-
arbitra.html.
178 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-A (repealed 1978).
179 Tulis, supra note 116, at 97-98.
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"binding procedure for the resolution of disputes" as an alternative to
maintain the public service.180 The Connecticut statute provides not only that
the parties submit last, best offers on unresolved issues, but also requires that
the parties estimate the cost of each of their offers on economic issues, and
allows the parties to continue to settle issues right up to the time of the
arbitrator's award. 181 This somewhat unusual provision, therefore, may
provide incentives for greater pre-award settlements than is common during
conventional arbitration and the process specified in other states. In
Minnesota, the statute for "essential employees" provides that if the parties
both agree in writing to arbitrate their bargaining dispute on a final-offer
package basis or on a final-offer issue-by-issue basis, then the arbitrators are
restricted to that choice.182 Principles and assistant principals are limited to
final offer arbitration on an issue-by-issue basis.183
TABLE 2 States' Public Sector Final-offer Interest
Arbitration/ Factfinding
State Statute Type of Final -offer Employees
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. Final offer on all State employees
§ 20.22 economic and
noneconomic issues on
issue-by-issue basis
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Final offer after Agricultural
Ann. tit. 13, mandatory mediation employees &
§1958-B(5A) associations.
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Final offer on issue-by- State employees
Ann. § 5-276a issue basis. Parties
(c) estimate costs of their
LBOs of economic issues
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. Final offer on issue-by- State employees
§ 179A.16 issue for some employees,
package basis for others.
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. Final offer by package Fire Fighters &
tit. 11, § 51- Police Officers
108(4)
Pennsylvania Pa. Stat. Ann. § Final offer Labor disputes
11-1122-A
Washington Wash. Rev. Final offer by package Labor disputes
Code §
180 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.231 (West 2006).
181 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276a (West 2006).
182 MIN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (West 2006).
18 3 Id.
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41.56.100
Michigan Mich. Comp. Final offer on issue-by- Fire Fighters &
WS. Ann. § issue basis Police Officers
423.238
Wisconsin Wis. Stst. Ann. § Final offer by package Public Safety -
111.77(4)(b) basis, State Patrol
or conventional if Troopers and
chosen by parties. State Patrol
Inspectors
New Jersey N.J. Stat. § Choice of six variations of Fire Fighters &
34.13A-16 conventional and package Police Officers
(non-economic) and issue-
by-issue final offer
(economic)
Ohio Ohio Revised Final offer on issue-by- Public Safety
Code 4117.14 issue basis
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. Final offer package basis, Protective
§ 243.746 economic and non- Services
(4)(a-h) economic issues
Illinois 5 Ill. Comp. Final offer on package of Security, Peace
Stat. Ann. economic issues Offers, Fire
315/14 Fighters
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. Final-offer by package Teachers (K-12)
(7/1/11) 20-29-6-15.1 basis after mandatory
(West 2012) mediation
B. Indiana's Last Best Offer (LBO) Arbitration for Teachers
A new Indiana statute requires last, best-offer (LBO) arbitration when a
teachers' union and school employer have reached impasse. 184 The
experience in the state before the new law in many ways mirrors that of
many other public-sector collective bargaining negotiations during the recent
recession-a high percentage of negotiations resulted in impasse, especially
because the prior law contained an evergreen clause providing that an
expired CBA remain in effect until a new CBA is ratified. Thus, during years
when employers were seeking concessions, unions had little motivation to
settle. The new law includes mandatory mediation and last, best-offer
arbitration in the fall of each year.'85 In its first year (2011), six of the eight
cases sent to mediation/arbitration were resolved by mediation (two were still
184 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-15.1 (West 2012).
185 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13 (West 2012).
25
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
pending when this article was being written), and none went to arbitration. 186
Thus, if the first year is any predictor of the future, the new law will
eliminate the impasse problem of the past and provide effective incentives
for more mediated settlements. The sole objective of this article is to review
the features of the new law as means of resolving impasse, and not to debate
the merits of the law.
A controversial feature of the new statute is the narrow scope of subjects
allowed to be negotiated.187 Primarily only wage, salary, and related fringe
benefits are subjects for negotiation.1 8 Issues such as working conditions,
school calendar, teacher dismissal procedures, and teacher evaluation
processes, which were on the table under the old law, are no longer
bargaining subjects. 189 On the one hand, limits on the subjects of bargaining
may make it easier for the parties to successfully negotiate or mediate a new
CBA-there is simply less to disagree about. On the other hand, the limits
may remove a safety valve that previously would have allowed the parties to
bargain-as opposed to using economic weapons such as a strike - over
subjects such as working conditions and dismissal procedures that many
teachers may feel strongly about. The limits on the subjects of bargaining
may in the long run-when the overall economic tide turns - make reaching
an agreement more rather than less difficult if teachers begin to use wages
and benefits - which are proper subjects of bargaining-as a proxy to obtain
employer concessions on matters of working conditions and dismissal
procedures. 190 Regardless of the effect on bargaining, the restrictions
unquestionably should be viewed as more desirable to school districts, which
now have undisputed rights over issues previously subject to negotiation, and
therefore a loss to the teachers' unions.
186 INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, www.in.gov/IEERB (last
visited Sept. 17, 2012).
187 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-4 (West 2012).
18 8 Id.
189 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-5 (West 2012).
190 See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J.
1369, 1370 (2009) (arguing that the narrowness of negotiable topics leads to collective
bargaining impeding effective government); see also, Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor
Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or
Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 885, 921-23 (2007) (suggesting
that limiting topics of negotiations for teachers can limit performance in the classroom
and stifle positive change that can lead to a more productive classroom experience). For a
related argument, see Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 277, 294-302 (2012), available at (arguing that public sector employees should
have greater-not fewer-workplace privacy rights because of the unique characteristics of
public employment).
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The new statute was passed largely in response to the large number of
bargaining impasses between Indiana school boards and teachers' local
unions during the current recession.191 The statute repealed the evergreen
provision of the prior law. 192 It (1) requires mediation before arbitration;193
(2) limits the scope of bargaining to salary and wage - related benefits
including paid time off;194 (3) sets a short time frame for the parties to move
from impasse, through mediation, to LBO fact-finding;195 and (4) requires
fact-finding and limits the fact-finders to the last, best final offer that does
not impose a financial hardship on the organization. 196 The new law provides
that within sixty days of a declared impasse, the Indiana Education
Employment Relations Board (IEERB) will appoint a mediator and that the
mediation may consist of no more than three sessions (and no more than
thirty days) and must result in either (1) an agreement between the parties, or
(2) each party's tender of its LBO.197 When the second option is the result-
i.e., each party provides a last best offer-then the new law requires that
within fifteen days the IEERB must initiate fact-finding, and the fact-finder
"must select one party's LBO as the contract terms."198 The fact-finder's
order is restricted to only those terms permitted to be bargained for in the law,
and cannot put the employer in a position of deficit financing.199 The fact-
finder's decision may be appealed to the IEERB. 200 The new law specifies
that unlike the old law under which fact-finding was advisory, the purpose of
fact-finding now is to provide a final decision if mediation is unsuccessful:
191 Indiana Governor O.K. 's Teacher's Collective Bargaining Limits, BUSINESSWEEK,
Apr. 21, 2011, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9MO4GC00.htm.
192 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-5 (West 2012).
193 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13 (West 2012).
194 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-4(a) (West 2012).
195 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13(a), (e) (West 2012) (after reaching an impasse
mediation must begin within 15 days and be concluded after 30 days); IND. CODE ANN. §
20-29-6-15.1(a) & (c) (West 2012) (if no solution is reached through mediation, parties
will enter fact-finding within 15 days and fact-finding must be completed within 15 days).
196 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-15.1(b) (West 2012).
197 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13 (West 2012).
198 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-15.1 (West 2012).
199 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-15.1(b) (West 2012).
200 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-18 (West 2012).
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Sec. 5. The purpose of factfinding is to provide a final solution on the items
permitted to be bargained under IC 20-29-6-4 whenever the parties are
unable by themselves, or through a mediator, to resolve a dispute.20 1
The new Indiana statute in § 7(a) also specifies the appointment process
of the final-offer fact-finder, and in § 7(b)(3) specifies that the fact-finder
must choose one of the parties' LBOs:
Sec. 7. (a) When a factfinder is requested or required under IC 20-29-6, the
board shall appoint a factfinder from the staff or panel established under
section 6 of this chapter.
(b) The factfinder shall make an investigation and hold hearings as the
factfinder considers necessary in connection with a dispute.
(c) The factfinder:
(1) may restrict the factfinder's findings to those issues that the factfinder
determines significant;
(2) must restrict the findings to the items listed in IC 20-29-6-4; and
(3) may not impose terms beyond those proposed by the parties in their last,
best offers.
(d) The factfinder may use evidence furnished to the factfinder by:
(1) the parties;
(2) the board;
(3) the board's staff; or
(4) any other state agency 2 02
The new Indiana statute further specifies the factors a factfinder may
consider in rendering a decision:
Sec. 8. In conducting hearings and investigations, the factfinder is not
bound by IC 4-21.5. The factfinder shall, however, consider the following
factors:
201 IND. CODEANN. § 20-29-8-5 (West 2012).
202 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-8-7 (West 2012).
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(1) Past memoranda of agreements and contracts between the parties.
(2) Comparisons of wages and hours of the employees involved with wages
of other employees working for other public agencies and private concerns
doing comparable work, giving consideration to factors peculiar to the
school corporation.
(3) The public interest.
(4) The financial impact on the school corporation and whether any
settlement will cause the school corporation to engage in deficit financing
as described in IC 20-29-6-3.203
Mediation as a means of resolving an impasse existed, in fact was
mandatory, in the old Indiana law that was repealed with the creation of the
new law. 204 However, under the old law, when mediation failed, a party
could request fact-finding-but the decision of the factfinder was only
advisory, not binding, and the evergreen clause in the old law continued the
existing CBA until a new one was reached, 205 which in recent years with no
possibility of any salary or benefit increases, often lasted for years. The new
law, however, gives substantial leverage to the mediation process because the
parties must either agree or submit to the mediator their LBO, which will be
submitted to final arbitration.206 The possibility of the arbitrator choosing the
LBO of the other party significantly increases the incentives of both parties
to reach an agreement through mediation because they will participate in the
formation of that agreement, and it eliminates the possibility of them being
forced to accept the other party's LBO in arbitration. While the new law has
been in effect only a short time, at least two mediators who experienced
mediation under the old law and the new law have witnessed the profound
impact on the parties' desire to reach agreement through mediation.207
The new Indiana LBO contains several potential advantages that have
been verified through recent experience. First, by requiring a mediation
process that can only end with an agreement or the parties' giving the
mediator their LBO, the new law eliminates the primary disadvantage of both
traditional mediation and traditional interest arbitration. That is, the primary
203 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-8-8 (West 2012).
204 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-8-6 (West 2012).
205 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-8-8 (West 2012).
206 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13(c). (West 2012)
207 The mediators are Michael R. Carrell, one of the co-authors of this article, and
his colleague Louis Manchise.
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risk of traditional mediation-ending without an agreement-may be
significantly reduced because of the parties' desires to avoid final-offer fact-
finding. Additionally, the primary disadvantage of traditional arbitration- the
parties receiving a decision they feel they had little input in developing and
cannot easily live with-is significantly reduced because they will be
incentivized to reach an agreement through mediation-a process in which
they do have a significant role in developing.
A second potential long-term advantage of the new law is the inclusion
of language that restricts mediation or fact-finding from resulting in deficit
financing for an affected school employer.208 The new law further specifies
that the budget revenues discussed by the parties must be those General Fund
revenues certified by the state before the negotiations begin. 209 Other
potential limited or one-time sources of revenues (Rainy Day funds) cannot
be used in a LBO or in fact-finding. 2 10 This provision will keep the parties
focused on a limited amount of funds to be negotiated, and thus create a
greater probability of success.
A third potential advantage of the new law is that it ends the evergreen
nature of the old law by requiring binding LBO fact-finding and thus
guaranteeing that a new CBA will be in place before January 1 of a new year,
and it limits the term of any new CBA to two years2' 1-thus minimizing
effects on future budgets.
C. Advantages & Disadvantages of Final-Offer Arbitration
In professional baseball, the final-offer arbitration process has changed
very little since it was first used in 1974. Today, owners can offer arbitration
to players with more than six years of service, and the players have the
option of arbitration or free agency. 212 In 2009, a typical year, only three of
the 23 free agents offered arbitration chose to arbitrate, rather than go into
the market.213 The major change has been in the weeks after final offers are
208 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-3 (West 2012).
209 Id
210 d.
211 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-12 (West 2012).
212 2012-2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 153, at 17-18.
213 Maury Brown, From Pujols to Jeter to Clemens to Freak: Salary Arbitration
Records, THE Biz OF BASEBALL (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=4901:from-
pujols-to-jeter-to-clemens-to-freak-salary-arbitration-
records&catid=26:editorials&temid=39.
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made and before the three member arbitration panels meet.214 Today, more
salary disputes are settled in this period and most "meet somewhere in the
middle," rather than risk arbitration. 215
Compared to mediation, fact-finding and conventional arbitration, final-
offer or last, best offer arbitration provides at least four advantages. First, it
can greatly reduce the chilling effect common in conventional arbitration of
economic issues-it encourages the parties to take a middle ground-rather
than polar position because the arbitrator will pick the more reasonable of the
two offers.216 Second, as it has in major league baseball, it offers a strong
incentive to the parties to settle during the pre-hearing stage. 217 Third, it
provides finality - it can provide public officials a final decision in a contract
dispute which can then be implemented during a new budget cycle. 218 Fourth,
it avoids the politically unpalatable prospect offered by interest arbitration of
an unelected arbitrator drafting a public-sector contract. As arbitrator Charles
Rumbaugh has written, the nonbinding ADR steps often do not work.219 The
best incentive is knowing the final resolution is within a certain range or one
of two outcomes - it creates an atmosphere for voluntary resolution. 220
One common criticism of final-offer arbitration is that there is the
possibility that neither party will submit a reasonable package. 221 When this
occurs, an arbitrator must choose between two unreasonable offers. 222
Respondents to this criticism have suggested using an issue-by-issue
approach instead of a total package approach. 223 Additionally, research on
final-offer arbitration demonstrates that the more transparent the final-offer
arbitration process, the more reasonable the parties' proposals will be and the
more likely the dispute is to settle. 224 For example, in one study of final-offer
arbitration scenarios structured in different ways, the study found that when
214 Maurey Brown, Evolution of Salary Arbitration: an ironic tale, Yahoo! Sports
(Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug-ys-
maurybrownarbitrationO 11910.
215 Id.
216 Tulis, supra note 116, at 100.
2 17 Id. at 91.
218 ABRAMS, supra note 133, at 146-47.
219 Charles Rumbaugh, Baseball Arbitration 2000,
http://www.sbcadre.org/articles/0010.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
220 Id.
221 FEUILLE, supra note 8, at 13.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Howlett, supra note 11, at 828.
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the parties knew their final offers would be disclosed to the other side, their
final offers were more reasonable and the parties were more likely to settle
their dispute. 225 A 1980 study in New Jersey concluded that final-offer,
compared to conventional arbitration, increases the probability of negotiated
settlements and compels the parties to present more reasonable, middle-
ground offers. 226
Another possible disadvantage of using final-offer arbitration in the
federal public sector is suggested by Elkouri & Elkouri in How Arbitration
Works.227 The authors point out that in some cases where the parties under
the District of Columbia Code were required to use final-offer arbitration,
they proceeded to move further apart, rather than closer to an agreement.228
To limit such a possible "chilling effect" on the negotiations when final-offer
is immediate, both parties should be required to show, in fact, that their last
offer is their best offer, and thus they have not included in it new items.
D. Recommendations
Public sector officials, employers, and labor organizations considering
final-offer arbitration as a method of minimizing or eliminating negotiation
impasses should carefully consider several issues:
1. Conventional v. final-offer. As described above, the advantages of
final-offer arbitration compared to conventional arbitration include
encouraging the parties toward middle ground, encouraging pre-hearing
settlement, finality, and party control over outcome. 229 Final-offer
arbitration is particularly attractive in situations, like MLB and public-sector
negotiations, where the traditional economic weapons are unavailable and the
parties' "locked-in" relationship with each other makes it difficult to
ascertain value on the open market.230
2. Day v. night version. In the "day" version of final offer arbitration
the arbitrator chooses one of two proposals submitted by the parties.231 In the
"night" version, the two proposals are submitted but held from the arbitrator
225 Justin Kelly, Study ofFinal-Offer Arbitration, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (Jan. 2009).
226 Joan Weitzman & John M. Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbitrators Toward Final-Offer
Arbitration in New Jersey, 35 ARB. J. 25, 33 (1980).
227 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 94, at 1143-45.
228 Id.
229 Tulis, supra note 116, at 89.
230 Id. at 102.
231 Amy Moor Gaylord, Interest Arbitration - Pros, Cons and How To's, ABA
Annual Meeting Section of Labor and Employment Law (Aug. 5-10, 2010).
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until the arbitrator has independently decided an award-and then the offer
closest to that value is the award. 232 This "night" version is most likely to
work when the parties are negotiating over a single issue-such as wages in
baseball arbitration. It is less likely to work when the parties are negotiating
over multiple issues, because that will make it much more difficult to
ascertain which offer is closest to the arbitrator's award.
3. Total package v. issue-by-issue. It is not clear, given the experience
of both forms in the public sector, if total package or issue-by-issue is the
better method of final-offer arbitration. 233 Critics of total-package final-offer
arbitration note that parties may include a few outrageous provisions in a
package that otherwise is relatively reasonable-and thus the issue-by-issue
format is preferable because it forces parties to present reasonable offers on
all issues.234 Total-package arbitration may also be a challenge if some of the
issues in dispute are non-economic issues-it may be difficult for the
arbitrator to compare the apples offered by one side to the oranges offered by
the other side. It also is possible that the issue-by-issue format may allow
arbitrators to split-the-difference and award each party some issues-a flaw in
traditional arbitration which final-offer arbitration is intended to avoid.235
However, in reality the issue-by-issue format is not likely to cause the
chilling effect on issues because the parties still strive to make the more
reasonable offers on each issue so their offer is selected, and the process
promotes pre-hearing settlement on at least some issues.236 The advantages
of total-package arbitration over issue-by-issue arbitration are that (1) it is
procedurally easier and faster because each side presents only one proposal,
and (2) the arbitrator can consider how the various pieces of the dispute fit
together as a whole-issue-by-issue arbitration may result in an agreement
containing lots of individually-reasonable provisions that do not fit well into
an integrated whole. 237
4. Include mandatory mediation. Both the revised Maine and new
Indiana statutes require mediation before final-offer arbitration. 238 The
obvious benefit of this provision is to strongly encourage settlement by
bringing in an experienced mediator just as looming arbitration is giving the
parties a particularly strong incentive to settle. Furthermore, the Indiana law
232 Id.
233 Tulis, supra note 116, at 102.
234 Id. at 102-03.
235 Howlett, supra note 11, at 830.
236 Tulis, supra note 116, at 102-04.
237 Howlett, supra note 11, at 830.
238 Id. at 831.
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specifies that the mediation must result in either a settlement or the parties
submitting a LBO;239 this promotes settlement during mediation and, if not,
then the arbitration process begins quickly. 240
5. Timing offinal offers. The exact timing of submissions of final offers
is critical.24 1 Submitting final offers as early as possible before the arbitration
hearing, and then allowing a "grace period" during which they may be
adjusted before the hearing begins-but not right up to the start of the
hearing-provides the parties incentive to achieve last minute settlement on
issues.242 The Connecticut statute even allows the parties to extend the grace
period and continue negotiating and possibly settle individual issues until the
award is issued-further incentive for last-minute settlements. 243
6. Economic v. Noneconomic issues. Baseball arbitration includes only
one economic issue - a player's salary for the upcoming season.244 Generally,
due to their quantitative nature, economic issues might be considered more
appropriate for final-offer arbitration. 245 Also, non-economic issues are less
likely to be compromised in conventional arbitration, and therefore the need
for final-offer arbitration is diminished. 246 Iowa, however, provides that both
economic and non-economic issues can be included in final offers with issue-
by-issue method of final-offer arbitration. 247 Critics of the issue-by-issue
approach might argue that including more issues, especially non-economic,
increases the probability of an arbitrator "splitting-the-difference" by roughly
dividing the issues between the parties-therefore losing one of the potential
advantages of final-offer versus conventional arbitration. Supporters might
argue that by expanding the list of issues for a final-offer arbitration, the
advantages of the process may be expanded. In Oregon, after the state law of
twenty-two years requiring conventional arbitrational was changed to final-
offer package arbitration, a study of the first three years of decisions noted
that the prevailing party frequently submitted fewer issues, and often only
239 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13(c) (West 2012).
240 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-15.1(a) (West 2012).
241 FEUILLE, supra note 8, at 41.
242 Tulis, supra note 116, at 105.
243 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276(a) (West 2006).
244 ABRAMS, supra note 133, at 29.
245 Tulis, supra note 116, at 100.
246 Id. at 88.
247 IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 2006).
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economic issues.248 In general, final-offer arbitration might work best when
limited to fewer issues and issues of an economic nature.
7. Criteria. State statues often require that an arbitrator consider
certain factors, most commonly: (1) employee wage comparability, (2)
employer financial position, and (3) public interests. 249 The New Jersey Act,
for example, lists nine criteria that an arbitrator may consider. 250
Comparability of wages and salaries both within a public organization, and
across a region or state within a certain profession such as police or teaching
and financial impact on the employer are the most common criteria.251 The
new 2011 Indiana statute specifies a short list of four clear criteria arbitrators
should consider; (1) comparability, (2) past CBAs and MOUs between the
parties, (3) the public interest, (4) the financial impact on the school
corporation and whether any settlement will cause the school corporation to
engage in deficit financing. 252 The short list limits the discretion of the
arbitrator, and in practice will likely focus on comparability and financial
impact-while specifically excluding the possibility of deficit financing, a
major issue in cases under the prior law. This is expected to be largely
achieved by the state certifying in advance of the negotiation process the
budget dollars available to the school organization for the year.
V. CONCLUSION
The current U.S. recession severely affected the budgets and therefore
negatively impacted the contract negotiations for many governments and
unions. For years in some cases, tax revenues have been flat or even declined
while health care and pension costs continued to climb-causing many
governments to seek concessions in the forms of wage cuts, unpaid furloughs,
and other forms of salary reductions. For many negotiators, it is their most
difficult round of economic negotiations since their very first CBA because
many bargaining units were initially formed in the 1970s and 1980s. The
result for many negotiations, especially for those CBAs with evergreen
clauses, has been at impasse for months or even years. Alternative dispute
resolution methods available to public sector negotiators to move beyond
248 RANDALL B. GROVES, LAST BEST OFFER, TOTAL PACKAGE ARBITRATION:
ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN INTEREST ARBITRATION FOR OREGON'S PROTECTIVE SERVICES
38-39 (1998).
249 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 94, at 1403-04,1442.
250 Tulis, supra note 116, at 122.
251 Id. at 120-21.
252 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-8-8 (West 2012).
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impasse primarily include mediation, and fact-finding or advisory
arbitration. 253 Both of these methods do not guarantee a settlement even in
normal times, and especially not in economic conditions like those in recent
years. Conventional arbitration, seldom used in the public sector, provides a
guaranteed settlement-but also often causes a chilling effect during
negotiation, and in addition, may result in decisions in which arbitrators
"split-the-difference." 254 Final-offer arbitration, available in some states as
well as in major league baseball, also guarantees a settlement of negotiation
impasses, but in comparison to conventional arbitration can provide the
parties a strong incentive to settle during the pre-hearing period and can
eliminate or minimize the chilling effect of conventional arbitration. 255
A new Indiana law provides for last, best offer arbitration for teachers
and school employers and contains some unique features that may be of
interest to others seeking an alternative method of impasse resolution. These
potential advantages of the new law include: (1) a mandatory mediation
process that includes a grace period during which the parties can continue to
strive to reach a settlement, (2) a restriction from deficit financing for the
affected schools, and (3) a timetable that guarantees that a new CBA will be
in place before a new budget year begins.
Public-sector officials, labor organizations, and employers considering
final offer arbitration as a means of avoiding or settling impasses should
consider several issues before making a decision: (1) the possible advantages
of final offer arbitration compared to conventional arbitration-the
elimination of the chilling effect and the encouragement of pre-hearing
settlements by the parties; (2) adopting the "day" or "night" version of final
offer arbitration; (3) adopting the total package or the issue-by-issue form of
final offer arbitration; (4) the inclusion of mandatory mediation, as in the
new Indiana law, to increase the probability of pre-hearing settlements; (5)
together with mandatory mediation, a grace period during which the parties
after reviewing the final offers may continue to negotiate settlements; (6)
restricting the final offer process to economic issues and as few as practical;
and (7) specifying criteria for the arbitrators to consider, including those
factors most commonly used by the states; public interests, wage
comparability, and the financial position of the employer-possibly including
the prohibiting of deficit financing as included in the new Indiana law.
253 Malin & Kerchner, supra note 190, at 913.
254 Tulis, supra note 116, at 88.
255 Tulis, supra note 116, at 99-100.
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